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Introduction 
 
What is Africa’s best hope for advancing its development initiatives? Should each  
state seek to compete independently on the world stage? Should they seek to forge 
relationships with external partners and the power players in the world economy on a 
one-to-one basis? Or should they work together in conjunction with the economic 
giants of the globalised economy? Of these three possible approaches this article 
seeks to investigate the third. Can the African states use a regional approach to 
economic development whilst still engaging and benefitting from external 
benefactors? Or will the traditional and developing powerhouses in the world 
economy simply use Africa’s efforts at regional integration as a way to garner favour 
and preferential access to African markets and resources? 
 
In the post colonial and post independence period, many African states sought to 
work with the former colonialists overlords in an attempt to develop their economies 
through a regional approach. Many of these attempts created little real benefit to the 
African peoples themselves. In the wake of these failed attempts at development via 
the perceived benefits of regional integration, new movements developed. A new 
approach to regionalism has appeared in the last three decades, whose hallmarks 
are quite different to the old approaches to regionalism. It is the intent of this article to 
make an empirical investigation into the progress of these new approaches to 
regional integration or ‘the new regionalism’ as it is often dubbed. I also wish to add a 
further element to this investigation. The ‘old regionalism’ traditionally featured 
African states seeking trade policy rationalisation/integration/development under the 
tutelage and patronage of the western states. However, one of key characteristics of 
the ‘new regionalism’ is that new partnerships between developing economies and 
the African states are emerging. These partnerships have the ability to either greatly 
help the African states in the path to development through regional integration, or 
they may hinder and derail these attempts.  
 
To this end I wish to investigate the greatest ‘developing’ economy in the world and 
its impact on Africa’s regionalisation projects. I am referring here to China. China has 
shown interest in Africa as a continent that has huge potential and as one that can 
provide great benefit to China’s rapid economic growth and expansion. To this end it 
seems particularly relevant to investigate how China seeks to expand its ties and 
increase its presence in the area. As both Africa and China can be seen as 
‘developing’, albeit both at very different levels, it should be particularly interesting to 
see how these two geographical and demographic juggernauts work together in the 
pursuit of their own developments. 
 
In order to undertake an empirical investigation of China’s impact on Africa’s 
regionalisation projects in a coherent manner a specific analytical paradigm will be 
used. Regional trade areas, agreements and associations that fit within the ‘new 
regionalism’ framework in Africa will be this paradigm. An outline of the new 
regionalism will be offered in the first section, along with an explanation of how this 
paradigm is different to the previous attempts or ‘old regionalism’ projects in Africa. 
 
In order to ‘ground’ the concept of the new regionalism in Africa, an explanation of 
the manifestations of new regionalism in Africa will be given. While there are a huge 
number of regional trade organisations and overlapping agreements in place in 
Africa1, only a limited number of regionalisation and economic integration 
organisations will be focused on. The focus will be on the African Union, The 
Southern African Development community and the Economic Community of West 
African States. This is due in part to word limit constraints, however, it is also due to 
my intention to focus on the regional integration organisations that are the most 
dominant and have the highest capability to make real progress in terms of 
advancing the benefits of regionalisation. In addition these organisations are very 
outward facing. They interact with the international community in a very real way. It is 
also an intention to focus on organisations that have links with the Chinese 
government, so the most effective empirical review of China’s impact on new 
regionalism as a whole in Africa can be given.  
 
After introducing the concept of new regionalism and outlining how it applies to 
Africa, the focus will shift to China. A review of China’s intentions and recent actions 
on the African continent will be offered. Particular attention will be paid to China’s 
support (or lack of support) for the African states’ regional economic integration 
projects. Such as support for technical policy committees, funding for regionalisation 
organisations and investment and support for the development of ‘regionalisation 
infrastructure’ and all that this entails. China’s official Africa policy will be given 
coverage and everything will be grounded by offering some raw economic data on 
the scale of China’s trade and investment interaction with the African states. 
 
The final section will attempt to bring the empirical data and analytical paradigms 
used together to reach a viable conclusion on whether China’s action in Africa has 
impeded or supported the regional integration efforts currently underway. This will be 
done via two sub sections, one addressing the conflict between Chinese actions and 
new regionalism projects in Africa, and the other addressing any coherence. In an 
attempt to contextualise the conflict section via the real world experience of 
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2:2004–2007 Strategic Framework of the Commission of the African Union’, May 2004, 
regionalisation ‘on the ground’, an outline of some of the failed attempts and 
regionalisation in the past will be given. These failures will be juxtaposed against 
current Chinese action to see if China may be dooming African to repeat the 
mistakes of the past. Under the coherence section, coverage will be given to explicit 
examples of Chinese support for new regionalism initiatives, along more ‘secondary’ 
modes of support such as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and resource 
extraction capability investment. The conclusions reached in the final section will then 
be recapped and discussed. 
 
New Regionalism 
 
The last two decades have seen a large influx of regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
into the globalised economic environment. As at December 2008 there are 421 RTAs 
which have been notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 230 of which were 
in force.2 Just five years prior there were only 184 of these agreements in force.3 The 
ingrained and widespread nature of these agreements can be seen by the fact that 
almost every member of the WTO is a member of at least one RTA. Some WTO 
members are signatories to more than 20 of these agreements.4 Regional trade 
agreements can potentially benefit a wide range of states regardless of what state of 
‘development’ their economies are in. Within the African context this may be 
particularly relevant, as regional trade organisation and integration efforts that seek 
to implement RTAs are becoming very widespread. This section will focus on 
outlining and explaining a specific paradigm of regionalism, namely the concept of 
                                                                                                                                         
Commission of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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World Trade Organisation. 
3 Pg 1, Burfisher, Mary E, Robinson, Sherman, Thierfelder, Karen, ‘Regionalism: Old and 
New, Theory and Practice’, (Paper prepared for The International Agricultural Trade Research 
Consortium). 
‘The New Regionalism’. It will address the features of ‘new regionalism’, such as the 
kinds of projects, agreements and development initiatives that fall within this 
paradigm. In order to try and elucidate the complexities of these projects in a clear 
and concise way the goals and mission statements of these ‘new regionalisms’ will 
be referred to. This will be done by explaining what these projects seek to achieve for 
their regions’ development. 
 
The agreements, initiatives and projects that fall within the ‘new regionalism’ 
paradigm represent a fresh approach to an old idea. They are an attempt to use 
economic integration, trade facilitation and monetary policy rationalisation as a way 
to breathe life into struggling or developing economies. Here this ‘fresh approach’ to 
regionalism and economic integration will be addressed, by outlining and discussing 
the key features and manifestations of the new regionalism. As a way to further 
explain the ‘newness’ of this approach, a comparison will be offered between the old 
regionalism and the new regionalism, or in other words what makes the new 
regionalism new?. What are features of this ‘new regionalism’? What would a region 
look like which has undergone or is working towards a more integrated economy? 
How would a more integrated approach to regional development manifest itself? 
Here an attempt to answer these questions will be undertaken by outlining the 
features of new regionalism. In particular what makes a region more or less 
regionalised and integrated? The concepts of shallow and deep integration will be 
referred to here, along with the specific projects and initiatives which give the concept 
of the new regionalism its pragmatic drive. Idealised implementation strategies will 
also be outlined and discussed. 
 
Old and New Regionalism 
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 One of the clearest descriptions of the new regionalism is offered by Burfisher, 
Robinson and Thierfelder in a paper they presented to The International Agricultural 
Trade Research Consortium. Here they referred to how new regionalism exhibits 
deeper integration within region, as opposed to the historical attempts at regional 
integration. They also point out that the growing links and interdependence between 
developing and developed countries marks a demarcation between new and old 
regionalism.5 These two principles, namely growing interdependence between 
developing and developed countries and deeper integration within regions, will be the 
hallmarks of new regionalism for the purposes of this article. I intend to use Burfisher, 
Robinson and Theirfelder’s classification of the new regionalism as a way to 
empirically investigate China’s impact on new regionalism in Africa.  
 
There are a number of features which speak to a deeper integration as referred to by 
Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder. In order to be clear about what is being referred 
to, what follows will be an outline of these features. The eight principles, as per 
Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder’s statements, will feature in the most integrated 
regional economies. Thereby exhibiting an idealised version of the new regionalism, 
that is a region which is completely integrated and regionalised economically 
speaking. From this we can work back and see not only how African states’ attempts 
at ‘deploying’ the new regionalism have advanced, but also the level of impact of 
China on this deployment. 
 
By virtue of its name, the new regionalism suggests that there have been attempts at 
regionalism in the past. These attempts are ones which have failed to live up to the 
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New, Theory and Practice’, (Paper prepared for The International Agricultural Trade Research 
Consortium). 
expectations of their regions. Therefore they deserve to be revived and refocused 
from a new point of view. Here a comparison of the old regionalism to the new will be 
offered. 
 
Burfisher, Sherman and Thierfelder offer some illuminating comments as to how old 
and new regionalism can be recognised and what the differences between the two 
descriptive paradigms are. One of the main ways they aim to explain the difference is 
by viewing regionalisms as integration at either a deeper or shallower level. They 
point out that the earliest efforts at regional integration can be witnessed during the 
first few decades after World War 2. During this phase of reconstruction and re-
alignment of global economic currents attempts were made to integrate economies 
on a regional basis. Burfisher, Sherman and Theirfelder state that these efforts 
witnessed only shallow integration at best. They state that old regionalism and hence 
shallow integration focused mainly on simply reducing or eliminating barriers to trade. 
Whereas new regionalism and hence deeper integration focuses on a more complex 
set of principles such as harmonising national trade policies and encouraging internal 
mobility factors.6 These factors are characterised by such things as the movement of 
capital or labour, and they generally manifest as rules of origin policies, immigration 
policies and the development of intra regional trade infrastructure. 
 
They point out that the Uruguay round of the negotiations on the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade marked a turning point from old to new regionalism. The 1986 
round of negotiations held in Uruguay was of fundamental importance to globalised 
trade practices for many regions, not least of which was due to the fact that this 
round led to the creation of the World Trade Organisation. 
 
Burfisher, Sherman and Theirfelder state that the negotiations that took place during 
this round exhibited agreements which showed a much deeper level of integration. 
These agreements sought to progress beyond the traditional regionalisation agendas 
such as commodity trade and border protection policies,7 agendas which can be 
seen as hallmarks of the old regionalism. They also state that the regional trade 
agreements signed through the 1980s and 1990s have exhibited deeper levels of 
integration and they have also sought to link developing and developed countries. 
They state that these are the ‘twin characteristics of the new regionalism.’ 
 
Burfisher, Sherman and Thierfelder state that ‘new regionalism can be characterised 
as involving many of the elements found in the deepest levels of integration, and also 
via the achievements of a full economic and monetary union.’8 They go on to 
describe features of an integrated economic region in terms of a hierarchy of 
integration elements. They state that there are a number of elements which could 
expect to be found in a highly integrated region; these eight elements are as follows 
(in order of increasing depth in terms of more integration).9 
 
1. Facilitating financial and foreign direct investment flows. 
2. Liberalising movement of labour within a regional trade area 
(agreement/association). 
3. Harmonising domestic tax and subsidy policies. 
4. Harmonising macro policies, including fiscal and monetary policies. 
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5. Establishing institutions to manage and facilitate integration. 
6. Improvements of communication and transport infrastructure. 
7. Harmonising legal regulation of product and factor markets. 
8. Monetary union – establishment of a common currency.10 
 
So if we view the above elements in order of regions exhibiting complete integration 
to limited/or the beginnings of integration, the list would look like this: 
 
1. Monetary union – establishment of a common currency. 
2. Harmonising legal regulation of product and factor markets. 
3. Improvements of communication and transport infrastructure. 
4. Establishing institutions to manage and facilitate integration. 
5. Harmonising macro policies, including fiscal and monetary policies. 
6. Harmonising domestic tax and subsidy policies. 
7. Liberalising movement of labour within a regional trade area 
(agreement/association). 
8. Facilitating financial and foreign direct investment flows. 
 
The elements above are what we would expect deeply integrated regions to exhibit. 
Therefore successful or highly progressed new regionalisation projects could be 
characterised by the above characteristics. These elements are worth reflecting on 
as an investigation of China’s impact on the progress of new regionalism in Africa is 
offered. In the next section where this investigation is attempted, the previous failures 
of regionalism in Africa (and whether China’s current actions are in line with the root 
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causes of these failures) will be juxtaposed against any examples of China facilitating 
the above elements. As these elements represent the idealised form of new 
regionalism, if China’s actions are found to be either explicitly or indirectly supporting 
and promoting these elements, then a clearer conclusion will be able to be reached 
on whether China’s activity in Africa is in conflict or coherence with the aims and 
strategies of new regionalism in Africa. 
 
Burfisher, Sherman and Thierfelder also offer another set of characteristics of new 
regionalism which are generally accepted as clear characterisations of this paradigm 
by commentators within regionalism academia. These will be useful as another 
vehicle for elucidating the concept of new regionalism, and thereby hopefully 
providing a clearer analytical base for reviewing the impact of Chinese actions on the 
new incarnation of regionalism in Africa. 
 
Burfisher, Sherman and Thierfelder see: 
• technology and knowledge transfers, and technology diffusion, especially 
from developed countries to developing countries, that increase 
productivity 
• dynamic comparative advantage and ‘learning by doing’ efficiency gains 
through increased demand from expanded trade 
• increased foreign direct investment that carries with it advanced 
technologies and hence increases in productivity, 
 
as further features and characterisations of the new regionalism. Again as with the 
previous section, these features will be juxtaposed against the ‘conditions on the 
ground’ relative to new regionalism in Africa and relative to China’s support or 
indifference to these conditions. 
 Manifestations of New Regionalism in Africa 
 
The concept of new regionalism may seem like an idealised approach to regional 
integration, something which would struggle to make any progress in any real sense 
against the context of the complexities of African inter-state relations. However, 
Africa exhibits a vast array of interlocking, independent and interdependent 
manifestations of new regionalism. As referred to in the introduction, the vast scope 
and complexity of regionalisation organisations, initiatives, projects and RTAs means 
that for the purposes of this article, complete coverage of the entire African context 
cannot be given. An attempt has been made to focus on the regional trade 
organisations, and their practical manifestations via RTAs and initiatives that will be 
most relevant to an empirical review of China’s impact on these mechanisms. To this 
end this article will be focussing on the African Union which was previously known as 
The Organisation of African Unity. Along with The Southern African Development 
Community and the Economic Community of West African States. As intimated in the 
introductory statements, these are the organisations which have the most relevance 
and opportunities to affect real change in terms of the regionalisation of Africa and 
the benefits that this entails. They also are the most relevant in terms of their outward 
facing nature. They have real and meaningful partnerships with many non-African 
states, most important of which is China for the purposes of this article. If we are to 
offer an interesting and relevant empirical investigation into China’s impact on the 
advancement of the new regionalism in Africa, then surely we should focus on the 
groups which actually have interaction with China itself. 
 
The African Union 
 
The African Union (AU), or previously The Organisation for African Union represents 
one of the longest and most sustained efforts at regional integration on a grand 
scale. The AU is a truly continental organisation whose membership consists of 49 
African states. The AU is a regional integration organisation in the most holistic 
sense as it seeks, as the name suggests, not only regional integration but continental 
integration.  
 
One of the key goals for the original Organisation of African Union was to bring 
together the wide variety of continental and sub-regional institutions and make them 
work together as one inter-related and integrated whole.11 The Sirte Declaration, 
issued when the AU was in its previous incarnation, called for ‘The Establishment of 
an African Union, with a view, inter alia, to accelerating the process of integration in 
the continent to enable it to play its rightful role in the global economy while 
addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they 
are by certain negative aspects of globalisation.’12 
 
In order to address this call the Sirte Declaration set out the objectives of the AU, 
some of which were: 
 
• to achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the 
peoples of Africa 
• to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent 
• to establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play 
its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations 
                                                
11 Page 8, ‘Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union’, Volume 2:2004–2007, 
Strategic Framework of the Commission of the African Union, May 2004, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 
12 The African Union, ‘About us/in a nutshell page’ http://www.africa-
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• to promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural 
levels as well as the integration of African economies 
• to promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise living 
standards of African peoples 
• to coordinate and harmonise the policies of existing and future regional 
economic communities for gradual attainment of the objectives of the 
union 
• to work with relevant international partners in the eradication of 
preventable diseases and the promotion of good health. 
 
The AU vision was updated and given more pragmatic drive in the 2004–2007 
strategic plan document. The AU vision as per the updated document is it create a: 
 
‘United and integrated Africa; an Africa imbued with the ideals of justice and peace; 
an inter-dependent and virile Africa determined to map for itself an ambitious 
strategy; an Africa underpinned by political, economic, and social integration which 
would restore to Pan-Africanism its full meaning; an Africa able to make the best of 
its human and material resources, and keen to ensure the progress and prosperity of 
its citizens by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by a globalised world; an 
Africa engaged in promoting its value in a world rich in its disparities.’’13 
 
In comparison with the statements made in the Sirte Declaration, the updated AU 
vision seems much more outwardly focused invoking terms like ‘globalised world’. 
This may be particularly relevant given this article is interested in juxtaposing the 
goals of this organisation and others like it against the actions of the dominant 
‘developing economy’, namely China. 
 How does the AU propose to set about achieving the goals and promoting its vision 
for Africa? The Abuja Treaty signed in 1991, set the goal of the creation of an 
economic and monetary union for the members of the AU. This treaty stated that the 
harmonisation of regional economic communities was a key goal, as these 
communities were cited as the ‘pillars of the AU’.14 The AU is also seeking to bring 
the myriad continental and sub-regional integration institutions together so that they 
can function with a more coherent strategy. 
 
So how does the AU plan to meet the two main goals, namely the creation a regional 
economic community and a monetary union? The African Union’s 2004–2007 
Strategic Plan states in order to meet its goals a set of objectives with staggered 
deadlines will be worked towards. Its short term objectives for the years 2004–2007 
will be to ‘consolidate institutional pillars and build human networks.’15 These 
statements refer to a wish to increase person-to-person and government-to-
government links between member states. This statement also speaks to a 
commitment to increase capacity of government organisations in member states 
which have been charged with working towards economic integration. The middle 
term strategic objectives for the years 2008–2015 are to ‘ensure convergence of virile 
regional economic communities.’16 This is referring to the associated mechanisms 
and initiatives which will allow functional regional economic communities to flourish 
and also allow these communities to group together in the continental context. Finally 
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the long term strategic goal which is to be achieved from 2015 onwards is to affect 
‘continental integration.’17 This is the final phase and end goal of the AU. 
 
In order to chart out how these goals will be achieved in the short to long term the AU 
set itself a number of strategic objectives for the period 2009–2012. The objectives 
for the AU’s ‘Development, Integration and Cooperation’ programme are given via a 
three pronged approach. These goals are to be pursued through the strategic 
objectives themselves, the strategies for pursuing these goals and the organisations 
that are tasked with implementing the strategies. The development aspect of the 
programme outlines three objective areas, ‘promote sustainable economic 
development’, ‘promote sustainable social and human development’ and ‘formulate 
frameworks for developing and sharing Africa’s Statistics, and Research and 
Development capacities.’18  
 
The first objective area outlines strategies such as ‘promote growth of intra-African 
trade and investments’, ‘accelerate infrastructure development with emphasis on 
interconnectivity, reliability and cost effectiveness’ and ‘promote agriculture 
development and food security.’19 The second objective area outlines strategies such 
as ‘develop and sustain human capabilities through increased access to health, 
education, nutrition, shelter’ and ‘promote policies and programmes on migration and 
combating human and drug trafficking.20’ The third objective area outlines strategies 
such as ‘promote and coordinate research and development initiatives amongst 
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member states’ and ‘support the development of institutions for the promotion of 
technological invention, innovation and indigenous know how.’ 
 
The integration element has one strategic objective area, namely to ‘strengthen 
continental integration.’ This objective seeks to implement strategies to ‘promote the 
free movement of people, goods, capital and services.’21 The cooperation element 
also has only one strategic objective area which is to ‘build and strengthen 
continental and global cooperation’ via the ‘promotion of growth of intra-African 
cooperation’ and to ‘establish and promote global strategic partnerships for Africa.’22 
 
The above is an outline of the AU’s goals and strategies which are to be 
implemented to pursue their objectives. These goals and strategies will be part of the 
empirical basis whereby China’s impact on this manifestation of new regionalism will 
be reviewed. 
 
The Southern African Development Community 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic 
integration organisation operating in Southern Africa. One of the key aims of the 
SADC is to establish a regional free trade area amongst its member states. 
 
The SADC has a membership of 15 states consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South 
Africa, Mauritius, Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles and until recently 
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Madagascar. (Madagascar has recently been suspended due to the events of the 
March 2009 Malagasy Political Crisis.) The SADC vision is as follows; ‘a common 
future, within a regional community that will ensure economic well being, 
improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice; 
peace and security for the peoples of southern Africa.’23 
 
The SADC treaty outlines the general objectives of the organisation, which are as 
follows: 
• to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance 
the standard of the quality of life of the peoples of southern Africa and 
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration 
• to evolve common political values, systems and institutions 
• to promote and defend peace and security 
• to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the independence of member states 
• to achieve complimentarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes 
• to promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of natural 
resources and effective protection of the environment 
• to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and 
cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.24 
 
The objectives above seem to follow the same ‘development through regional 
integration’ approach that the AU outlined. But how does the SADC seek to put these 
lofty goals into practice? In order to pursue these goals the SADC states that it will: 
 
                                                
23 SADC, ‘SADC Profile’ (http://www.sadc.int/) 
• harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member 
states 
• mobilise the peoples of the region and their institutions to take initiatives 
to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to 
participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of 
SADC 
• develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to free 
movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples 
of the region generally within member states 
• promote the development of human resources 
• promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology 
• improve economic management and performance through regional 
cooperation 
• promote coordination and harmonisation of international relations of 
member states 
• secure international understanding, cooperation and support, mobilise the 
inflow of public and private resources into the region 
• develop such other activities as member states may decide in furtherance 
of the objectives of the SADC. 
 
The SADC sees that the establishment of a free trade area amongst its member 
states has the ability to be a real impetus to reaching the goals it has outlined above. 
Background documentation regarding the purpose of the SADC states that ‘The Free 
Trade Area is a step along the path towards deeper regional economic integration – 
which is key to the strategy and objectives of SADC.’25 In order to facilitate the 
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creation of the FTA in this context, the SADC states that its member states have 
already made considerable progress in areas such as: 
 
• harmonising customs procedures and customs classifications 
• increasing customs cooperation 
• reducing costs by introducing a single, standardised document for 
customs clearance throughout the region 
• establishing ‘one stop’ border posts which cut the time spent at the border 
in half 
• making transhipment easier by enabling a single road to be used when 
transporting goods across several borders within the community. 
 
The above outline of the SADC gives some background to its idealised function and 
objectives over the mid to long term. Again as with the AU example, the SADC in its 
capacity as an example of a manifestation of new regionalism in Africa will be used 
as an empirical basis for testing China’s impact on the progress of these integration 
projects. 
 
 
Economic Community of West African States 
 
The final regionalisation and economic integration organisation I wish to give an 
outline of is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This group 
encompasses a large geographic and demographic area. Many of its member states 
enjoy vast amounts of mineral, petro chemical and forestry resources – assets which 
China needs to drive its economic development. 
 
ECOWAS includes many of the states which have been given the ‘least developed 
country’ status; therefore they are a group that could potentially benefit greatly from 
the idealised benefits of regional economic integration. ECOWAS current 
membership consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
ECOWAS has recently suspended two of its members, namely Guinea and Niger, 
both as a result of coup d’etat and/or associated political crisis. 
 
The nature of the ECOWAS groups’ initiatives and projects may seem slightly more 
basic and less grand in comparison with the AU and the SADC, however, this reflects 
the fact the ECOWAS states appear to be strictly in the ‘capacity building phase’. Not 
just in terms of improving governance and rationalising trade policies in the region; 
rather ECOWAS seem to be working on the real fundamentals of developing their 
economies. The following outline of ECOWAS objectives, strategies and initiatives 
will highlight this fact. Even though ECOWAS may appear to be ‘behind’ or that they 
have a slightly more rudimentary approach towards economic integration in 
comparison with the other two groups, ECOWAS should still be considered a 
regional integration force. This group is also of particular relevance to the context of 
this article as China has considerable interests in this region, such as cotton in Benin, 
gold in Ghana and oil in Nigeria. 
 
The Economic Community of West Africa States is a regional group of fifteen 
countries, founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration in ‘all 
fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social 
and cultural matters.’26 Its overall objective is ‘to promote cooperation and integration 
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with a view to establishing an economic and monetary union as a means of 
stimulating economic growth and development in West Africa.’27 In order to meet this 
overall objective, ECOWAS outlined a number of objective areas and associated 
initiatives to pursue these objectives. 
 
The ‘trade and customs’ objective area is one of the key areas in terms of how 
ECOWAS will seek to achieve its regional economic integration goals. Within the 
trade and customs context the establishment of a common market in West Africa is 
the key objective. The creation of a common market requires the creation of a free 
trade zone and the institution of a customs union. The implementation of these two 
mechanisms has been highlighted by ECOWAS as key steps on the road to the 
creation of the common market in West Africa. The ECOWAS states have also 
adopted a common approach to liberalising their trade and customs policies. This 
project includes initiatives such as the elimination of customs duties and taxes and 
the abolition of non-tariff barriers within Member States exchanges.’28 The ECOWAS 
governments are also seeking to increase their capacity relative to the infrastructure 
of their financial institutions via measures such as establishing computerised data 
processing systems and developing software for the processing of external trade 
statistics.29 Further steps along the road to a common market in West Africa include 
the harmonisation of economic and fiscal policies among member states and the 
creation of a second monetary zone which will include The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
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The ECOWAS region is vast and includes a collection of landlocked states whose 
economic development will be heavily reliant on capable overland transport 
infrastructure. The ECOWAS member states have recognised this and have 
instituted a plan to develop their region’s transport infrastructure in the hope that 
intra-region trade will benefit as a result. Some of the projects in this area include the 
construction of West African highway networks from Lagos, Nigeria in the east to 
Nouakchott, Mauritania in the west. This highway network would also run from Dakar, 
Senegal in the south to N’djamena, Chad in the north. In total the highway would 
cover around 11,000 km of interconnecting highways and roads. Other initiatives in 
the transport infrastructure area include the creation of a common insurance scheme, 
known as the ‘brown card’ scheme, along with an attempt to harmonise regulations 
relative to transport among member states.30 
 
Along with transportation, consistent and well distributed energy supplies are key to 
economic development within the West African context. Again the ECOWAS member 
states have recognised this need, and in order to address this several energy-related 
projects have been implemented. The West African Gas Pipeline project is a key 
initiative in the quest to make better use of West Africa’s natural resources, both for 
domestic energy requirements and also to enhance the ECOWAS states’ energy 
export industry. The ECOWAS states have adopted a treaty which covers the 
implementation of the West Africa Gas Pipeline within four countries, Ghana, Togo, 
Benin and Nigeria. They also have a plan in place to facilitate the development of the 
means of energy production and interconnection of electricity grids in member states. 
This interconnection is to result in the creation of a West African energy system 
which will be known as the ‘West African power pool.’31 
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 Another key facet of improving infrastructure and capacity amongst ECOWAS states 
is the drive to update their current telecommunications systems. In order to address 
the deficiencies in current telecommunications capabilities ECOWAS has 
implemented a project which was dubbed INTELCOM 1. One of the initiatives under 
the telecommunications umbrella was the installation of a direct telephone, telex and 
fax connectivity between member states. Another was the establishment of a 
telecommunications centre in Lome, Togo. A sister project known as INTELCOM 2 
sort to modernise the inter-state connectivity amongst ECOWAS nations.32 
 
Finally ECOWAS have attempted to increase the capability of their agriculture 
sectors. As many of the states within western Africa rely primarily on agriculture, and 
in some states at subsistence levels, it will be of the utmost importance to develop 
these industries so they can be more productive and more reliable. To this end 
several projects were implemented to improve productivity in the agricultural sector. 
These included the establishment of seed production centres and the setting up of 
eight community cattle breeding centres in member states. ECOWAS states also 
sought to improve the production and inter community trade of livestock and animal 
products.33 
 
The above section outlined the concept of new regionalism and provided some 
context on this paradigm via reference to regional economic integration organisations 
in Africa. These two issues, new regionalism and its manifestation in Africa will be the 
two concepts that are bought together and discussed in the final section. This will be 
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done in order to see if China’s actions in Africa are in coherence with the new 
regionalism paradigm or whether they are in conflict.  
 
China in Africa 
 
It is no secret that China has been pursuing an active partnership with many African 
states. China’s rapidly growing economy will live and die on its ability to secure large 
amounts of resources and commodities. Africa represents a fertile ground for 
securing the building blocks China needs to maintain its current rapid growth. 
 
How China goes about developing this partnership may serve to be a litmus test of 
sorts for a new way or form of the developed–developing state relationship. While 
Africa has the resources and potentially the manpower, it is lacking in many of the 
areas that are essential to develop these resources. Infrastructure at both public and 
corporate levels is well below par in many states. Many of the initiatives developed 
by African states to address these failings have fallen well short of their objectives. 
Can China, with its almost unlimited capital along with its experience and expertise in 
developing its own economy aide the African states in getting their regionalisation 
initiatives back up and running within this new dawn of regionalism? Or will China 
seek to do nothing more than pay lip service to the regional organisations, while only 
making just enough investment in infrastructure to get the minerals out of the hills 
and to the furnaces of mainland China? 
 
Here I will address these questions by digging into the facets of China’s involvement 
and growing relationship with Africa. Reference will be made to Beijing’s official 
policy on Africa. How does it seek to engage with the African states and to what level 
does it aim to work at a regional level? Beijing’s strategic short and long term goals 
will also be discussed with reference to its Africa policy. The nature of China’s 
involvement ‘on the ground’ will be outlined. What and where it is investing and in 
what will be discussed. Its official economic assistance and aide projects will also be 
referred to. Finally some raw economic data will be offered so that the scope of 
China’s involvement in Africa can be seen in a more real world sense. 
 
This section will serve to highlight how and why China wishes to develop its 
relationship with the African states and organisations. The nature of China’s 
involvement in Africa will then be tested against the ‘best case scenario’ for the 
deployment of the new regionalism on the continent, and also against previous 
failures of regionalisation projects. This will be done in order to see how China’s 
actions in Africa may affect or may already be affecting the progress of new 
regionalism in Africa.  
 
China’s Africa Policy 
 
The Chinese Government released its official policy on Africa in January 2006. The 
document entitled ‘China’s Africa Policy’ covered China’s plans for engagement with 
Africa. This document covered how China would support the development of the 
economies of African states and also how China aimed to access Africa’s burgeoning 
markets and resource-rich primary sectors. Here coverage will be given to the 
Chinese government’s statements regarding its official policy on Africa. Particular 
reference will be made to China’s statements regarding the regionalisation 
organisations, namely the facets of this policy which speak to China’s engagement in 
Africa and how these will either directly support or impede the project of new 
regionalism in Africa. 
 
Within the initial section of the policy entitled ‘Africa’s position and role’ specific 
reference is made to The African Union, and how China wishes to recognise this 
organisation as a key force increasing political security on the continent.34 This is a 
particularly bold and clear message of support for the African Union as one of the 
premier organisations that can secure a safe environment against which African 
states can pursue their development agendas. This speaks to China’s reliance and 
possibly preference for dealing with this manifestation of new regionalism in Africa. It 
will be worth reflecting on these statements when we come to review how much 
China has supported or neglected new regionalism on the continent. 
 
One of the key statements in the second section which is entitled ‘China’s relations 
with Africa’ speaks to how China seeks to interact with Africa in an overall ideological 
sense. It goes as follows ‘sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and 
common development – these are the principles guiding China–Africa exchange and 
cooperation as the driving force to lasting China–Africa relations.’35 Although these 
could appear to some as not much more than rhetoric drawn up by the diplomatic 
marketing staff, it could also be an important and deliberate piece of symbolism. By 
making this statement Chinese officials may be seeking to distance themselves from 
the kinds of arrangements other major powers have had with African states. The use 
of terms like ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘common development’ seem to speak to a more 
cooperative and less one-sided relationship in terms of interaction between Africa 
and external powers. China may be looking to represent itself as a power that seeks 
to work with the African states to develop economies and industry, rather than simply 
extracting resources and sending the profits back to Beijing. This could be important 
when we come to China’s overall engagement approach with new regionalism in 
Africa. 
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Similar statements are made in part three of China’s Africa Policy where it states that 
one of China’s general principles in Africa is ‘sincerity, friendship and equality. China 
adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence, respects African countries’ 
independent choice on the road of development and supports African countries’ 
efforts to grow stronger through unity.’36 The references to ‘independent choice on 
the road of development’ are important here. It has been noted37 that one of the 
reasons for the failure of new regionalism in Africa is due in part to African states’ 
unwillingness to cede the required amount of sovereignty to allow regional initiatives 
to advance. This will be covered further in the next section; however, this is an 
important thing to note at this stage. 
 
Now we will move into the more explicit and detailed statements in terms of how 
China seeks to engage with the African states. The policy refers to China’s intentions 
to facilitate the access of African goods to Chinese markets by granting duty free 
access to certain goods from the least developed countries. Further facilitation for 
joint ventures will be made via the China–Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. It also states that ‘when conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate 
Free Trade Agreements with African countries and African regional organisations.’ 38 
Here is a clear example of China’s intentions relative to trade facilitation within the 
new regionalism paradigm. 
 
Other pertinent statements within the policy include references to supporting 
infrastructure development in Africa. Within the ‘infrastructure’ section, the policy 
states that the Chinese government seeks to increase its cooperation with African 
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states in their quest to improve transportation, communication, water conservancy, 
electricity and other infrastructures. Again this is another clear example of China 
seeking to support new regionalism in Africa, as one of the key vehicles to increase 
the progress of economic integration is to increase the capacity of infrastructure.39 
 
Many ‘development via regional economic integration’ initiatives have been 
hamstrung by crippling debt repayment arrangements40 enforced on African states. It 
appears as though China has recognised this issue and is seeking to ease the 
burden of debt on the developing economies of African states. In reference to this 
matter China’s Africa Policy states that ‘China is ready to continue friendly 
consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to, or reduction 
of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed 
countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction 
and relief for African nations.’41 This could be an important factor when we come to 
review how China’s actions have impacted the progress of new regionalism in Africa. 
Some commentators have noted that harsh debt repayment agreements have forced 
some African states to be put their own domestic financial constraints ahead of 
regional economic concerns.42  
 
The final section of China’s Africa policy makes some of the most pertinent remarks 
in terms of the purpose of this article. This section is entitled ‘China’s relations with 
African Regional Organisations’ and it refers to China’s commitments to the current 
manifestations of new regionalism in Africa. The policy states that ‘China appreciates 
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the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and 
promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation 
with the AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional and international affairs 
and stands ready to provide the AU assistance to the best of its capacity.’ It also 
states that ‘China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa’s sub-regional 
organisations in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in 
their own regions and stands to enhance its amicable cooperation with those 
organisations.’ 43 This is a very clear example of China’s intentions relative to its 
interaction with regionalisation organisations. It shows that China sees the African 
Union as not only the key regionalisation organisation, but it also shows that Beijing 
sees the AU as a positive force in terms of how Africa interacts with the international 
community. Finally it speaks to a commitment to support the AU in all of its 
endeavours. These appear to be fairly clear statements regarding how China seeks 
to interact with this manifestation of new regionalism in Africa. However, as these are 
policy statements they should be tempered with a sprinkling of cynicism, and they 
need to be backed up by empirical evidence. This will be covered in the second part 
of this section. 
 
China’s Activity in Africa 
 
This section will be a review of China’s activity in Africa, both in terms of the level of 
trade between China and African states and also China’s commitment to 
development projects on the continent. 
 
China’s recent record of trade with the African continent has seen some dramatic 
increases. The exports from African states to the Chinese market have increased at 
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around 50% each year from 2000 to 2005. As a comparison the growth rate of 
African exports to the US is two and a half times less and four times less to the 
European Union (EU).44 During this same period China’s foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Africa was around US$1.3 billion.45 Although the majority of this FDI was for 
a time focused in states that have considerable oil and mineral deposits, this is 
beginning to change. As at 2004 Chinese FDI in Africa was around US$900 million, 
however, total FDI from all countries in Africa at the same time was US$15 billion.46 
So as the reader will be able to see, Chinese investment in Africa was still relatively 
small in terms of total global investment. 
 
China has had a lot history of providing economic and development aid to African 
states, stretching right back to the mid 1950s. Fifty years later China had provided 
$5.5 billion in aid to the continent.47 The guiding principles of China’s support for 
Africa’s development were set during the early stages of this ‘development partner’ 
relationship. China stated that ‘no conditions or demands for privileges’ can be 
attached to the official development aid that is offered to Africa.48 
 
China has supported the development of African economies by furnishing states with 
‘soft loans’. As at 2006 China had delivered US$800 million worth of these 
concessional loans to the continent. These loans provided capital for over 50 
different projects in 22 different states.49 In addition to providing soft loans China has 
sought to ease the burden of development in Africa by writing off large swathes of 
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debt owed to it by various states. Beijing stated that it would write off US$1.5 billion 
worth of loans owed to it by over 150 countries. This statement was delivered at the 
first China–Africa Cooperation forum in 2000.50 Although China’s Africa Policy was 
covered in the previous sub section it will be worth offering some more contexts in 
terms of actual commitment of funds to the continent. At the 2006 Beijing summit 
where the policy was delivered, the Chinese Government stated that it would double 
its current rate of economic and development assistance to African states by 2009. 
Beijing would also provide a further US$5 billion in concessional loans and credits to 
the African states. In addition to this China would cancel all interest-free debt that it 
was owned by 33 African states. Finally the Chinese Government sought to 
encourage further investment in Africa by establishing a US$5 billion fund.51 In 
support of the wider economic development of African states China has been 
providing export credits, loans and investment guarantees for Chinese firms who are 
willing to invest in developing economies. These have been facilitated through the 
China Exim Bank.52 
 
The Chinese aid programme offers support for a wide range of infrastructure and 
development-related projects. Technical assistance has been offered in the fields of 
agriculture and official development aid (ODA) has been given towards the delivery 
of humanitarian and infrastructure projects.53 However, the majority of the funding 
was provided for infrastructure projects, as at September 2006, 79% of China’s 
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funding given via China Exim Bank was for infrastructure projects.54 Exim Bank being 
the main financial institution through which China’s ODA is delivered.  
 
 
Jian-Ye Wang of the World Bank points out that there has been a sizeable increase 
in China’s ODA budget in recent times. He states that assuming Chinese aid 
comprises about half of the value of contracted projects, its ODA to sub Saharan 
African states could have been around US$1.5 billion annually during 2004 and 
2005. Whereas China’s total aid into the continent from 1982–2002 was only US$310 
million annually.55 This speaks to the fact that China has rapidly increased the scope 
and nature of its activity in Africa during the last decade, in particular in the oil-rich 
sub Saharan states such as Angola and Nigeria. This may be interesting for the 
purposes of this article as both of these states are members of multiple 
regionalisation organisations, namely the Economic Community of West African 
States and the African Union. They are also states that could benefit from the 
infrastructure projects and associated integration initiatives which are part and parcel 
of the goals of these organisations. However, Wang reported that the last official 
statement from the Chinese Government regarding its development budget in Africa, 
delivered in 2002, stated that China had provided only US$1.8 billion in economic 
support to Africa. This points to the fact that the official statements coming out of 
Beijing can sometimes contradict with the situation ‘on the ground’ in Africa, which is 
something worth considering.  
 
The scope of these projects in terms of capital provided by China may seem 
impressive, however, the figures show that China’s commitment to Africa has not 
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been that high in relative terms. As at 2005 the Chinese government had approved 
around US$6.5 billion worth of funding for these projects. However, this was only 
10% of China’s Exim Bank’s loans.56 Again there must be a proviso offered here, as 
Wang points out, that estimates made by World Bank staff for around this time are 
much higher, in fact they estimate that almost US$12.5 billion had been delivered 
around this time. 
 
The nature of the infrastructure investment is wide and varied; however, a large 
investment has been made in transportation networks. Over the last ten years 
Chinese companies have been very active in constructing and repairing road and rail 
networks. During this time over 6000 kms of road has been built or earmarked for 
construction. More than 3000 kms of railway tracks and associated infrastructure 
have also been constructed.57 Other important infrastructure developments have 
been facilitated via Chinese aid and investment. A steady power supply free from the 
threat of blackouts is of fundamental importance to any economy; this is particularly 
true to developing economies. Many African states have woefully inadequate power 
production and supply infrastructure. To support this facet of the development of 
African economies China committed itself to support the construction of eight large 
and medium sized power plants.58 More extensive detail of how this investment and 
ODA is being spent will be covered in the final section. This detail will be constrained 
to this section so a more direct comparison can be made between the goals and 
strategies of regionalisation organisations and the actions of China on the continent. 
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The intent of the preceding section was to give the reader a brief outline of the scope 
and nature of China’s interaction with the African states. There was an intentional 
focus placed on China’s recent commitments to Africa in terms of FDI and ODA, 
however, some historical context was also provided. There was also an intentional 
focus placed on China’s commitment to the manifestation of new regionalism in 
Africa, namely the regionalisation organisations such as the Africa Union. The 
remarks made in China’s Africa policy coupled with references made to ‘the 
conditions on the ground’, namely the scope of China’s FDI and ODA should 
hopefully clearly elucidate Beijing’s commitment to the continent. Hopefully this will in 
turn serve as a good empirical grounding for a review of China’s support or 
indifference towards the progress of new regionalism in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
Conflict or Coherence 
 
Conflict? 
 
How have previous attempts at regionalisation in Africa faired? Have they managed 
to set themselves obtainable goals and make real progress in obtaining the benefits 
of regionalisation? This section will make reference to Percy Mistry’s rather damning 
critique of Africa’s record of regional cooperation and integration. This article outlines 
how and why regionalisation has failed in the past and some of the major factors that 
have impeded its progress. This critique will be used as a basis for a comparison with 
current Chinese actions, to see if they (China) have been putting the same 
roadblocks in the path of regionalisation as Mistry refers to. Due to the fact that 
Mistry is offering a historical critique of regionalism, the majority of his references 
relate to old regionalism, however, both old and new regionalism will be affected by 
the same negative factors relative to the advancement of regional economic 
integration.  
 
Mistry’s remarks may be particularly illuminating in reference to this question of how 
successful regionalism in Africa has been. He states that ‘from an objective, impartial 
perspective, Africa’s commitment to integration appears to have been visceral rather 
than rational, more rhetorical than real. African integration ideals have been based on 
lofty transcontinental ambitions, evocative political slogans, a plethora of treaties and 
regional institutions, high-minded principles and protectionist proclivities.59’ Is this a 
fair approximation of Africa’s record of regionalisation? 
 
This section will cover the main stumbling blocks African states have run into in their 
quest for regional economic integration. This will be offered as a vehicle for 
assessing the impact of China’s actions on the progress of current regionalisation 
projects in Africa. A historical account of the reasons why regionalisation projects 
have failed in Africa will be juxtaposed against China’s current interaction with the 
states and their attempts at the ‘new regionalisation’. This will be done as an attempt 
to see if China’s current actions will doom the regionalisation in Africa to run into the 
same hurdles it met in the past. That is, are the actions of the Chinese state similar to 
other states which have impeded the progress of regionalisation in Africa?The 
answer to this question will hopefully create a clearer picture as to how much the 
actions of China are in conflict with the goals and strategies of new regionalism in 
Africa. 
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Two conflicting pre-dispositions have influenced efforts at regional integration, 
namely: 
• adherence to colonial borders drawn in European capitals 
• emphasis from independence onwards, the importance of economic 
integration across Africa’s sub regions and the continent as a whole.60 
 
Both of these points from Mistry speak to the idea that the geographic make up and 
the large degree of importance placed on economic integration across the sub 
regions have led to a flawed implementation of regionalisation. Regionalisation 
projects are trying to work against fundamentally flawed geography, over inflated 
targets and over optimistic goals in relation to wholesale integration. Mistry points out 
that Africa is trying ‘to remain politically separate while being convinced they need to 
achieve economic fusion at arms length,’61 he states this has ‘confused means and 
ends.’ 
 
There has been much reference made to the importance of infrastructure for 
developing economies, and in particular among states who are looking to develop 
inter-state trade via regionalisation. To this end Mistry points out that, ‘After forty 
years of independence (article written in 2000), Africa’s physical infrastructure still 
reflects its colonial inheritance.’ He states that, ‘its transport and communications 
links remain geared to extracting and exporting tropical beverages and minerals, they 
are not yet designed to foster inter Africa growth and trade.’62 So the African states 
have still not made enough progress in terms of the infrastructure capability required 
to implement any real increases in inter-state trade. Without major upgrades to 
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roads, rail and telecommunications, the sometimes lofty ideals of economic 
regionalisation will not have the means to advance. 
 
Mistry paints a very bleak picture when referring to the progress of regionalisation 
projects in Africa. He states that ‘it [regional integration] has not yet yielded results by 
way of enhanced efficiency, or in terms of successful industrialisation, market 
enlargement, modernisation, sustained development and growth, or 
competitiveness.’63 In terms of the evolution of regionalism in Africa he claims that 
‘some of the first attempts at regional economic integration in Africa were 
characterised by agreements which advocated industrialisation through high levels of 
protection and development of closed markets in state run economies which were 
financed heavily by external official development aid.’64 He remarks that this 
approach resulted in little progress towards to goals of regionalisation or towards the 
objectives of the regional agreements as protectionism is liable to become firmly 
entrenched in Africa rather than it being seen as just one stage on the road to 
development. Mistry points out that protectionism in Africa becomes the end rather 
than the means of development. Mistry states that trying to use protectionism as a 
way to develop economies is destined to fail for the above reasons. 
 
There are also some very pertinent historical examples of failures within specific 
regional trade organisations and agreements. The Economic Community of Central 
African States was setup to advance the goal of regional economic integration in an 
attempt to raise the living standard of its member’s states citizens. One of the 
mechanisms for achieving this goal was to secure the free movement of goods, 
services and peoples across the central African states. This was to be achieved by 
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the creation of a customs and monetary union, a common and external tariff and a 
central customs administration. However, these initiatives were railroaded by the 
confusing nature of the subsequent agreement, in which tariff preferences varied 
wildly, depending on what firm, product, country of origin or country of destination 
you were dealing with.65 Mistry points out that this created major distortions and 
obstacles to any real integration between the individual markets of member states. 
So within the context of the central African sub region, there were lofty ideals of how 
the ultimate ‘integration product’ would be delivered, but what resulted was not 
technically adequate. The detail of the subsequent arrangement managed to actually 
create more of the problems it originally sought to remedy. 
 
As ECOWAS is one of the regionalisation organisation I referred to when outlining 
how new regionalism manifests in Africa, it would be relevant to see what stumbling 
blocks this group has run into along the road to its regionalisation goals. ECOWAS 
set itself similar goals regarding the creation of a customs union and a common 
market. However, Mistry points out that intra-regional trade was running at around 
7% of total trade at the time of his article (2000) so, he states, the regional economic 
integration was far from reaching its goal. However, Mistry makes an important 
proviso, something which could be applied to many of the African sub regions. The 
progress of the creation of regional economic integration mechanisms has been 
hampered by large scale armed conflict among member states.66 An example of this 
is the First and Second Liberian Civil War which was waged over 1989 and 1999 
respectively. These conflicts implicated neighbouring states such as Burkina Faso 
and Cote d’Ivoire. If member states are in open conflict with each other, or even if 
they are implicated in a less explicit way, how can we expect them to be plotting 
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military manoeuvres against each other on the one hand and then get together 
around the board room table and rationalising tariff rates on the other?  
 
Mistry makes an interesting comment regarding the always controversial structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP). These programmes were implemented by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They attached conditionalities on 
either getting new loans or restructuring loans under lower interest conditions for 
developing countries. He states that although some of the ECOWAS states have 
enjoyed some successes in terms of increased intra-regional trade, these successes 
are drying up as the harsh conditionalities of SAPs have forced many states to 
become more selfish and more insular.67 This speaks to an interesting point 
regarding the impact of external forces on regionalisation projects for 
struggling/developing economies. This may be worth remembering and reflecting on 
when we consider how China has managed its aid and finance offerings in Africa. 
 
According to Mistry’s work, some of the key obstacles to the progress of regional 
integration projects include: 
• vested interests that have profited from development failure, these include 
Africa’s leadership and state apparatus 
• those officials and state organisations that are reluctant to accelerate a 
paradigm shift that weakens their power and reduces opportunities for 
satisfying the private agenda of pubic officials 
• a failure of African governments to translate their commitments in regional 
treaties into real changes in their national policies 
• an unwillingness shown by African governments to set aside national 
political interest in order to achieve long term regional economic goals 
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• an unwillingness to cede the necessary amount of sovereignty to regional 
organisations 
• no monitoring and enforcement mechanisms put in place to ensure 
adherence to agreed upon timetables relative to things like non-tariff 
barrier reductions.68 
 
While these points relate more to the failures of the ‘old’ regionalism projects, Mistry 
also offers some advice on what needs to happen if the ‘new’ regionalisation efforts 
are to succeed. It will be illuminating to see how these ‘requirements for 
regionalisation’ fit against the actions of China to see if they are in conflict. 
 
In terms of the general progression of regional integration in Africa, Mistry lists 
several prescribed approaches which may help, such as: 
• African states need to make the right choices in terms of partnerships for 
regional integration if they are to succeed in meeting the goals of these 
regionalisation projects. He cites the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) as a an example of this 
• there needs to be a greater level of convergence among integrating 
economies relative to key macroeconomic and development indicators, 
such as interest rates, monetary policy and on general fiscal structure and 
policies 
• integration efforts need to be backed up by formal agreements or 
arrangements with other established trading blocs. Mistry offers the EU as 
an example and states that this kind of relationship would bolster their 
credibility and durability.69 
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 The above section was designed to serve as a review of negative impacts on 
regionalisation projects in Africa which fall within the ‘new regionalism’ paradigm. For 
the purposes of reviewing China’s impact on new regionalism, the negative impacts 
discussed above will be juxtaposed against any Chinese actions which may replicate 
these issues. Could China’s recent interactions and relationships with the African 
states possibly cause these negative factors to reappear within the new regionalism 
paradigm? Or has China in fact actively avoided promulgating these impacts by 
pursuing a much more interdependent relationship with the African states relative to 
their regional integration efforts? 
 
As was mentioned above and in previous sections, infrastructure development has 
been highlighted by many regionalisation organisations as a key part of the overall 
integration project. The importance of infrastructure development was further 
bolstered by Percy Mistry’s comments, where he states that Africa’s infrastructure 
projects have not met much real progress. Mistry states that the lack of progress has 
had a direct impact on regional integration projects, as the upgrades to things like 
communications and transport links required to increase inter African trade have not 
materialised. Has China’s actions in Africa bolstered or hindered the development of 
infrastructure within the regionalisation context? It is my contention that China has 
supported the development of infrastructure on the continent, and that by supporting 
this important ‘new regionalism’ initiative China’s actions are indeed in coherence 
with new regionalism in Africa in general. As part of one of the earlier sections, 
reference was made to China’s planned commitment to Africa’s development which 
was outlined in ‘China’s African Policy’ and statements such as ‘the Chinese 
government seeks to increase its cooperation with African states in their quest to 
improve transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other 
infrastructures’70. These sorts of ‘policy statements’ coupled with empirical evidence 
such as the fact that the Chinese government via Chinese companies have built 
around 6000 kms of roads, 3000 kms of railroad tracks and constructed power 
plants,71 seems to be fairly solid evidence to support that contention that China is 
seeking to remedy this particular bug bear of new regionalism in Africa.  
How the African states seek to open up their markets to external trade could be 
integral to the progress of regionalisation and economic integration. As outlined 
above, Mistry comments that previous attempts at regionalisation in Africa where 
characterised by protected closed markets. Closed markets will not foster the 
increase in inter-state trade within regions, nor will they help the development of 
trade and the African economies in a general sense. If we review China’s actions 
relative to this particular stumbling block to regionalisation, has Beijing promoted or 
discouraged the introduction of a closed market policy within the developing African 
economies? Based on the statements in China’s Africa Policy it appears as though 
Beijing is discouraging the spread of closed markets within these developing 
economies. This policy states that China will facilitate the access of African goods 
into Chinese markets via the adoption of duty free access for certain goods from 
certain African states. China seeks to take this arrangement to the ultimate logical 
conclusion, namely to eventually create a network of free trade agreements with 
African states and African regional organisations.72 By fostering free trade and 
discouraging the spread of closed market practices, China’s appears to be 
supporting the African regional organisations in their efforts to avoid the pitfalls of this 
particular approach to new regionalism. 
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The political and geo-strategic context within the African ‘regions’ will obviously have 
a huge impact on the progress of new regionalism on the continent. This was alluded 
to in the above section, with specific reference to the first and second Liberian Civil 
War and the impact these events had on the progress of the ECOWAS integration 
programme. Has China been working to support peace keeping initiatives in Africa as 
a way to avoid the negative impact conflict can have on regional integration projects? 
The statements made in ‘China’s Africa Policy’ indicates a strong will to work towards 
a more stable continent, particularly through China’s cooperation with the AU. This 
policy refers to China’s appreciation of what the AU is doing for regional stability. At 
the most recent meeting of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, the Chinese 
side reaffirmed this appreciation and restated its commitment to supporting the AU in 
these endeavours. The action planned which resulted from this meeting featured 
several clear statements relative to Chinese support for peace keeping via the AU. 
For example, Section 2.6.2 states that ‘The Chinese Government appreciates the 
concept and practice of ‘Solving African Problems by Africans. It will continue to 
support the efforts of the AU, other regional organisations and countries concerned to 
solve regional conflicts, and will intensify cooperation with African countries in 
peacekeeping theory research, peacekeeping exchanges and in supporting the 
building of peacekeeping capacity in Africa.’73 This commitment from the Chinese 
government speaks to a clear intention to support and develop peace keeping 
capability in Africa. We could conclude from this that China is supporting the African 
states in their efforts to not let regional conflict railroad the progress of the new 
regionalism.  
 
As would be expected, many developing economies within Africa have had to rely on 
external funding in order to secure the capital they need to pay for vital domestic 
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services and projects. This funding has often come in the form of loans provided by 
financial institutions based mainly in western states. As referred to in the above 
section, Percy Mistry pointed out that the repayment plans and resulting structural 
adjustment programmes which appear due to certain states’ inabilities to repay loans, 
have caused many problems for regional integration initiatives. The conditionalities 
attached to these repayment plans have forced many African states to become more 
insular and inwardly focused, which in tern has a negative impact on regional 
economic concerns.74 Have China’s activities and commitments to the African states 
and regional organisations had a negative or positive impact on the constricting 
influence of state debt on the continent? As part of the Chinese government’s 
commitment to support the developing of African economies they have outlined a raft 
of debt reduction and cancellation arrangements. For example, at the 2006 Beijing 
summit the Chinese government indicated that it would cancel all interest-free debt 
that was owed to it by 33 African states. This was in addition to the cancellation of 
US$1.5 billion worth of debt which was cancelled in 2000. So in terms of easing the 
burden of debt relative to the progress of regional economic integration, China 
appears to be supporting this part of the overall successful facilitation of new 
regionalism in Africa. 
 
Based on the above it appears as though the Chinese Government’s actions relative 
to African regionalisation organisations have been mostly positive. Their actions do 
not seem to be leading into or producing the same road blocks to regionalisation as 
outlined in the work of Percy Mistry. China has facilitated and supported the 
development of badly needed infrastructure in African states. They have promoted 
the expansion of African markets into new realms, thereby avoiding the potential 
pitfalls of closed markets. The Chinese military has supported peace keeping efforts 
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within African regions, thereby providing local governments with a much more stable 
ground from which they can seek to advance economic integration initiatives. Finally, 
China’s sympathetic stance on debt forgiveness will hopefully allow African states to 
focus more on regional economic concerns rather than the individual state level 
constraints that have resulted from the SAP conditionalities. Reviewing something as 
complex as one external states’ impact on the progress of something as potentially 
abstract and ethereal as regionalisation is tricky. However, by focusing on specific 
stumbling blocks to regionalisation and how China has acted relative to these 
challenges I believe we can come to some meaningful conclusions. Namely, that 
China has sought to alleviate these challenges where possible and that they have 
tried to implement initiatives which can be seen to support Africa’s attempts at 
regionalisation. 
 
Coherence? 
 
Based on the conclusions reached above, China has not actively impeded the 
progress of new regionalism in Africa by replicating the negative impacts which have 
plagued regional integration efforts in the past. However, how has China actively 
supported new regionalism in Africa? This section will review China’s activity relative 
to projects such as infrastructure development, technical support for the 
rationalisation of trade policies and the facilitation of market access. These kinds of 
projects are the sorts which could be expected to have a real positive impact on the 
progress of new regionalism in Africa.  
 
China reaffirmed its relationship with Africa when it announced a new set of 
commitments at the 2006 Forum on China–Africa cooperation. Many of these 
commitments speak directly to China’s support for the mechanisms required to 
effectively implement new regionalism in Africa. The Chinese Government is 
supporting and facilitating investment in Africa through the establishment of a China–
Africa development fund. This fund is worth around US$5 billion. The facilitation of 
more external investment is a key step on the road towards economic integration, as 
investment is the backbone of many facets of the integration effort. Investment will 
not only allow infrastructure projects to proceed, but it can also stimulate local 
industry via the creation of new production and processing facilities. 
 
I would like to offer a few examples of this in practice, to hint at the share scale of 
Chinese investment in Africa, and how much this may facilitate the advancement of 
African industry in general. This is because increasing the efficiency and scope of 
industry in general is obviously a key step in terms of increasing intra-regional trade 
and cross-border exchanges within the regional context.  
 
Examples include: 
• investment of US$24 million in a textile mill in Zambia along with further 
investment of US$300 million into mines, manufacturing projects, 
construction companies and agriculture in Zambia75 
• a plan to rehabilitate the Kamatanda copper and cobalt mines and three 
processing plants in Katanga province, Democratic Republic of Congo. 
This investment is worth around worth US$27.5 million76 
• implementation of an economic cooperation zone in Sierra Leone. 
Resulting in the establishment of around 20 Chinese companies, which 
produce a range of goods including spring mattresses, roofing tiles and 
hair lotions77 
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• a Chinese telecommunications company (Huawei) which facilitates the 
advancement of infrastructure by offering wireless technology CDMA 
products78 
• Chinese companies are working to improve telecommunications in other 
states, such as the work of the ZTE Corporation International in Angola. 
Here ZTE has built a fixed line telecommunications utility. ZTE invested 
around US$400 million to build Angola’s telecom network, upgrade the 
military telecommunications system, and construct a mobile phone factory 
• in Nigeria, Chinese activity is supporting the progress of light industry. For 
example, Hashan company has invested US$6 million in the local 
shoemaking industry.79  
 
Another key vehicle in terms of advancing intra-region trade within the African 
regions is the creation of new markets for African goods. If African industries can 
increase the ability to sell their goods in general, then this should hopefully allow 
these industries to become more productive and viable. If these industries are more 
viable in general, then it is more likely that they will be able to increase their 
possibilities for intra-regional trade. China can be seen to be supporting the long term 
goal of increasing intra-regional trade amongst Africa’s region by facilitating the 
creation of more markets for African goods. China has begun this facilitation effort by 
expanding the list of duty free exports it accepts into its domestic market from Africa. 
China is also seeking to create trade cooperation zones within Africa to further aide 
these efforts.80.  
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One of the most pertinent statements form China’s African Policy Paper relative to 
the facilitation of intra-region trade, was a commitment to launch free trade area 
negotiations with the Southern African Customs Union.81 This can be seen as the 
starting point from which China will negotiate free trade agreements with the other 
regionalisation organisations. Here China is directly supporting the progress of 
deeper integration between itself and the regional organisations, and in turn 
advancing the progress of new regionalism in general. It is likely that by encouraging 
agreements between itself and other regional groups it may be working to support 
the long term goals of these groups. This could conceivably happen via technical 
assistance to the African economic institutions, which would result through increased 
contact between Chinese officials with expertise in these areas. 
 
As was referred to in previous sections and above, the sometimes crippling nature of 
state debt within Africa has seriously hamstrung efforts at regional integration. The 
Chinese development efforts with their African partner states have addressed this 
need. President Hu Jintao reaffirmed China’s commitment to help African states get 
their debt levels and repayment structures under control at the 2006 Summit. He 
stated that China would double its assistance levels as at 2006 relative to grants and 
debt relief. China would also cancel all interest free loans owed by eligible countries 
that would mature at the end of 2005.82 
 
Increasing capacity in a variety of different sectors of African economies has been 
highlighted as an important part of the new regionalism projects on the continent. 
This is particularly relevant within the West African context. For example, ECOWAS 
has indicated that increasing the capability and technical proficiency is a key part of 
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their long term strategies. While increasing the capabilities and diffusion of new 
technology within industry may not seem like an ‘integration’ agenda, it is part of the 
wider regionalisation project as signified by the ECOWAS example. China has 
signalled it wishes to support this facet of new regionalism via provided technical 
assistance where applicable. The Chinese government stated that they would 
provide training for African professionals via a programme whereby Chinese 
agricultural experts would be sent to Africa. Beijing has also stated they would 
support the establishment of agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa. 
In a more general sense relative to increasing technological and academic capacity 
China stated that it would double the scholarships it will offer to African students.83 
 
At this point it will be worth returning to the original question namely, has China 
directly supported the progress of new regionalism in Africa? Based on the above 
statements there appear to be many examples of how China has indeed supported 
the projects and initiatives fundamental to the advancement of new regionalism on 
the continent. China has supported the facilitation of investment on the continent; this 
has resulted in an influx of wan into many African states. Of particular interest to this 
article are the investments in local industry and infrastructure capacity building. 
Beijing has supported the development of African industries in a wider sense by 
opening up new markets for their products. The development of African industry 
should go some way to promote intra-region trade and thereby support the wider 
regionalism agenda. They are further supporting domestic African industry via 
provided expert technical advice and training. Although the above examples do not 
refer to China’s supporting new regionalism in a direct financial sense, I believe they 
show Beijing has committed itself to support a wider range of ‘development’ and 
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‘capacity’ style initiatives which will allow the regionalisation organisations to become 
more capable and therefore more likely to meet their long term goals. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The original intention of this article was to attempt an empirical investigation into the 
impact of China on new regionalism in Africa. This has proved to be a fairly 
complicated process, not only due to the somewhat abstract and confused means 
and ends of the integration organisation, but also due to the fact that China does not 
have an ‘official policy on African regionalisation’ as such. With this in mind I sought 
to undertake a very focused approach to this task, via focusing on specific 
regionalisation organisations and also on a specific ‘empirical investigation scheme’. 
Namely, by restricting the investigation to the organisations that do have a 
relationship with the Chinese government, I believe I have offered up a practical 
outline of new regionalism in Africa from which we can investigate the impact of 
China on this paradigm of integration. As ‘new regionalism’ represents a new 
approach to the old goal of regional integration, it seemed that it may be particularly 
relevant to review the impact of THE ‘new global power’ on this form of regionalism. 
 
Before any investigation into China’s impact on regionalisation was attempted, an 
explanation and discussion on a specific regionalism paradigm was offered. The 
focus on the agreements, organisations and projects characterised as ‘new 
regionalism’ was chosen due to the recent prevalence of these sorts of fresh 
approaches to integration within the globalised trade environment. Given Africa’s 
geography, prevalence of resources (both human and material) and currently 
underdeveloped infrastructure, this continent could potentially benefit greatly from 
regional economic integration as represented by the ‘new regionalism’ paradigm. The 
what, why and how of new regionalism was explained through a comparison with 
previous attempts at regional integration characterised via the ‘old regionalism’ 
paradigm. The concept of new regionalism was further elucidated by outlining its 
practical manifestations in groups such as the African Union, Southern African 
Development Community and The Economic Community of West Africa States. 
These groups were given coverage by referring to their goals, strategies and visions 
for what regional integration can do for Africa. This section was to provide the 
conceptual background regarding what new regionalism is and how it applies to the 
African context. 
 
Once the conceptual and practical framework was laid down in terms of what new 
regionalism is, the next task was to review the nature and scope of China’s activities 
in Africa relative to this. This section covered China’s idealised dealings with Africa 
via its African policy document. The idealised nature of ‘China’s Africa Policy’ was 
given empirical grounding via reference to levels of Chinese investment, the nature of 
Chinese backed infrastructure projects and the Chinese governments’ actions 
relative to trade policy with African states. The intention of this section was to provide 
a true empirical background in terms of China’s actions relative to the new 
regionalism in Africa. By outlining this background it was hoped that a more solid 
position would be gained from which an attempt to review China’s impact on new 
regionalism could be launched. 
 
The final section was an attempt to bring everything together, namely compare 
Chinese actions relative to practical manifestations of new regionalism to see 
whether China has had a positive or negative impact on the progress of this form of 
regional integration. The first of the two ‘empirical vehicles’ for this investigation was 
to compare previous stumbling blocs which have plagued new regionalism against 
China’s actions relative to these issues. These stumbling blocks included things like 
lack of progress in infrastructure development, the use of closed markets as a vehicle 
for economic development and the constricting nature of debt repayment 
conditionalities. It was found that China had been supporting efforts to overcome 
these issues through initiatives such financing infrastructure development, opening 
up Chinese markets to African goods and offering very favourable debt forgiveness 
arrangements. The second ‘empirical vehicle’ was an outline of direct Chinese 
support for the new regionalism agenda in Africa. This included further detail on the 
Chinese government’s commitments to infrastructure development, peace keeping 
operations, debt cancellation and trade policy. All of these initiatives can be seen to 
be directly support the new regionalism agenda as espoused by groups such as the 
African Union. 
 
A complete objective assessment of how China has impacted the advancement of 
new regionalism in Africa is a very complicated and lengthy process, a task which for 
the purposes of this style of article must be constrained in certain senses. However, 
by focusing on specific groups and on a tightly focused empirical review method, I 
believe an interesting and relevant investigation has been offered. It is the contention 
of this article, based on the groups reviewed and schemes employed, that China’s 
actions have supported and promoted the cause of new regionalism in Africa. The 
commitments espoused by the Chinese government’s African Policy, and the 
empirical data which backs up these statements, speaks to a real partnership 
between China and the African regional integration organisations. However, only time 
will tell whether this partnership will produce the long term goals highlighted in the 
strategic documentation of groups such as the African Union. Furthermore, even if 
these organisations do meet the goals they have set themselves, the jury is out on 
whether these goals will deliver real benefit in terms of any increases in the quality of 
life for Africa’s people. 
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